

STA 6351, Report.2.7

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2.7

Dynkin's theorem offers a likelihood-based characterization of minimal sufficiency. Unlike the factorization theorem, it does not rely on explicit algebraic decomposition of the joint PDF; rather, it identifies the minimal sufficient statistic directly from the shape of the likelihood ratio.

(a) What does Dynkin's theorem add conceptually beyond the factorization theorem? Why might it be preferable in theoretical development, even though both lead to the same sufficient statistics?

Dynkin's theorem gives a likelihood-based characterization of minimal sufficiency by defining an equivalence relation on sample points: two observations \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} are equivalent exactly when the likelihood ratio $L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})/L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{y})$ is constant in $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. This equivalence classes map is (up to a bijection) the minimal sufficient statistic. The result replaces the need to find an explicit algebraic factorization of the joint density with a direct criterion based on indistinguishability of samples for all parameter values. It is often preferable in abstract theory because it is model-agnostic and measure-theoretic, directly yields minimality and uniqueness, and connects sufficiency to the likelihood principle, simplifying arguments when explicit factorization is awkward or unavailable.

(b) How does Dynkin's theorem embody the likelihood principle? Explain why $L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})/L(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0 | \mathbf{x})$ captures all information about $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ needed for inference, and why proportional likelihoods imply equivalent inference.

Dynkin's formulation implements the likelihood principle by treating the likelihood function up to a multiplicative constant as the complete datum for inference about $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Fix a reference parameter value $\boldsymbol{\theta}_0$. For any observation \mathbf{x} we may write

$$L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x}) = L(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0 | \mathbf{x}) \frac{L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})}{L(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0 | \mathbf{x})},$$

so all $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ -dependent variation in the likelihood is contained in the ratio $\Lambda_{\mathbf{x}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) := L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})/L(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0 | \mathbf{x})$. Thus $\Lambda_{\mathbf{x}}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is a complete summary of the evidence in \mathbf{x} about $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ up to an $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ -independent scaling.

If two samples \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} satisfy

$$L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x}) = c(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{y}) \quad \text{for all } \boldsymbol{\theta},$$

then $\Lambda_{\mathbf{x}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \Lambda_{\mathbf{y}}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and every likelihood-based quantity is identical for \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} . Concretely:

- Bayesian posterior: $\pi(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x}) \propto L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})\pi(\boldsymbol{\theta})$. Proportional likelihoods give $\pi(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x}) \propto c(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{y})\pi(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, which normalizes to the same posterior as for \mathbf{y} .
- Point estimation by maximization: $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{\text{MLE}}(\mathbf{x}) = \arg \max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} L(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \mathbf{x})$ is invariant to multiplicative constants, so proportional likelihoods yield the same MLE.

- Likelihood-based intervals and tests (likelihood-ratio statistics, evidence ordering) depend only on ratios of likelihood values, hence are identical for \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} .

Therefore Dynkin's equivalence relation (samples with proportional likelihoods are equivalent) formalizes the likelihood principle: data that induce the same likelihood function up to a constant carry the same information about θ , so any valid inference based solely on the likelihood must coincide.

(c) In exponential-family models, canonical statistics are often minimal sufficient. Why does Dynkin's result make this intuitive? (Hint: How does the likelihood ratio depend on the canonical statistic?)

Write the exponential-family form

$$p(\mathbf{x} \mid \theta) = h(\mathbf{x}) \exp \left\{ \eta(\theta)^\top T(\mathbf{x}) - A(\theta) \right\}.$$

Hence for two samples (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})

$$\frac{L(\theta \mid \mathbf{x})}{L(\theta \mid \mathbf{y})} = \frac{h(\mathbf{x})}{h(\mathbf{y})} \exp \left\{ \eta(\theta)^\top (T(\mathbf{x}) - T(\mathbf{y})) \right\}.$$

All θ -dependence enters through $\eta(\theta)^\top (T(\mathbf{x}) - T(\mathbf{y}))$; therefore the likelihood ratio is constant in θ exactly when $T(\mathbf{x}) = T(\mathbf{y})$ (assuming $\eta(\theta)$ is not degenerate). By Dynkin's criterion the equivalence classes determined by $T(\cdot)$ are the minimal sufficient statistic, so the canonical statistic $T(\mathbf{x})$ is minimal sufficient (up to a one-to-one transform).

(d) Why is minimal sufficiency important in practice? Discuss how using the minimal sufficient statistic can simplify Bayesian updating or likelihood-based inference without loss of information.

Minimal sufficiency is important because it provides the smallest possible data reduction that preserves all information about the parameter. If $T(X)$ is (minimal) sufficient then, by factorization,

$$L(\theta \mid \mathbf{x}) = h(\mathbf{x}) g(T(\mathbf{x}), \theta),$$

so Bayesian updating and all likelihood-based inferences depend on \mathbf{x} only through $T(\mathbf{x})$:

$$\pi(\theta \mid \mathbf{x}) \propto g(T(\mathbf{x}), \theta) \pi(\theta).$$

Consequences: lower-dimensional summaries for storage and computation, simpler analytic or conjugate updates, identical MLEs and likelihood-ratio tests using T alone, and straightforward elimination or conditioning on nuisance parameters—achieving maximal data reduction without information loss.